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Abstract
We simulate societal opinion dynamics when there is confirmation bias in
information gathering and spread. If decision making is influenced by confir-
mation bias, the agent puts more weight on positive information to confirm
hypothesis or reservation in the learning process, which renders selectivity
in information gathering. If the utility discovered post purchase is low, it
is externalized rather than internalized (i.e., self blame) for the selectivity
of information. This causes the agent to outweigh the negative information.
These two mechanisms are simulated to investigate the societal opinion dy-
namics and explain behavioral patterns such as overconfidence, stickiness of
response and “success breeds success” phenomenon.
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1 Introduction
Opinion dynamics (OD) refers to the process of opinion adjustments and for-
mations among interacting agents. We build on the communication regime
by Hegselmann and Krause (2002) to describe opinion dynamics and con-
vergence when agents exhibit confirmation bias in learning and spreading
opinions. The bias results in average social characteristics such as over con-
fidence, unequal distribution of revenue among movies and slow response to
positive news. The bias reflects social psychological behavior in information
selectivity and opinion dynamics.
It is common for humans to learn through observation and communi-
cation with other agents before making a purchase decision. This practice
enables them to test the expectation or the hypothesis formed prior to the
purchase. During the search process, hypothesis-consistent information is
more easily adopted to confirm the hypothesis than hypothesis-inconsistent
information to disconfirm the hypothesis. In psychology this learning mech-
anism is referred to as confirmation bias. Confirmation bias can be defined
as the seeking or interpreting of evidence or information that conforms to the
existing beliefs, expectations or hypothesis (Nickelson, 1998). In this article,
we intend to describe this learning process and relate it to collective societal
decisions.
Consumers begin to form hypotheses and beliefs on a particular product
through observation and experience, which is then used as a benchmark
for subsequent learning process. For example, through previous experience
of a movie star or a director, consumers expect the same or better stunts
and innovations from the newly released movie. If these prior expectations
are successfully captured in the trailer or preview, the producer needs less
compelling evidence to convince the consumers than when the movie is new.
Similarly if an advertisement successfully erects a reference product in the
mind of the consumers, the search process will look for information that
conforms to the benchmark.
In the learning process with confirmation bias, people typically seek in-
formation that supports their hypotheses or beliefs and interpret information
in ways that support these hypotheses or beliefs. However, people tend not
to seek and perhaps even avoid information which are against the hypotheses
or beliefs (Koriat et al, 1980). Several mechanisms are at play in this process.
First, people tend to restrict their attention to a favored hypothesis. Second,
they prefer information that increases their confidence in their favored hy-
pothesis. Third, people look only or primarily for positive cases as examples
to support their hypotheses, which then leads them away from discovering
that a hypothesis is incorrect (Nickelson, 1998). Fourth, people tend to over-
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weigh hypothesis-consistent evidence and underweigh hypothesis-inconsistent
evidence. In other words, people tend to require less hypothesis-consistent
evidence to accept a hypothesis than hypothesis-inconsistent information to
reject a hypothesis (Pyszczynski and Greenberg,1987). Fifth, people see what
they are looking for. If they are looking for evidence to support their existing
hypothesis, they will see this supporting evidence.
Psychologists cite many sources of positive expectation, and among com-
mon ones are preferential treatment for supportive evidence for one’s opin-
ions or beliefs (Baron, 1995), overconfidence of one’s belief or hypothesis
(Pyszczynski & Greemberg, 1987), effects of one’s expectations (Snyder and
Campbell, 1984), the importance attached to drawing a correct conclusion
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg,1987) and other determinants such as self-esteem
and cognitive consistency. When people form hypotheses or beliefs, they
tend to expect their beliefs to be confirmed rather than disconfirmed. How-
ever, this is not to suggest that agents deliberately ignore evidence, as once
expectations are formed, the cognitive process of information search and eval-
uation take over, giving the sense that the search process is impartial and
unbiased. Unaware of the consequences of bias, people engage in the search
and evaluation process without intending to treat evidence in a biased way
(Nickerson; 1998).
This paper intends to model confirmation bias in the micro level de-
cision making process, and relate it to the macro level opinion formation.
We relate the bias in information search to explain the societal decision
making behavior, such as the skewness of revenue in the theatrical mar-
ket, speed of acceptance between positive and negative news, overconfidence
and loss aversion in information spread. We find that confirmation bias rein-
forces confidence and encourages opinion convergence when the hypotheses
are confirmed. This is because positive and favorable information reinforces
confidence level stronger than non-favorable and negative information. How-
ever, opinion divergence occurs when the hypotheses are disconfirmed. This
is because agents externalize the blame on external factors rather than the
selectivity in information search. This causes the spread of favorable infor-
mation to be slower than the spread of negative news.
The paper is divided into 6 sections. Section 2 focuses on past studies on
confirmation bias and reviews some of the applications of confirmation bias
in different streams of literature. Section 3 shows how confirmation bias is
formed and how it is applied in the learning process. Based on Section 3,
simulations are conducted to test the opinion dynamics given the different
levels of confirmation bias. This is done in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
the results of the simulations, particularly the formation of opinion clusters.
Section 6 explains the implications. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Past Studies on Confirmation Bias
In the models by Weisbuch et al (2001) and Hegselmann and Keause (2002),
opinion dynamics occur when opinions of the interacting agents are close
and below a threshold value. Opinions which exceed the threshold level are
ignored or opinions which are sufficiently different do not have influence on
the agents concerned.
This selectivity is referred to as confirmation bias in psychological liter-
ature,(for comprehensive review see Nickerson; 1998). People tend to give
greater weight to information that supports their view rather than informa-
tion that runs counter to it. This preferential treatment for the supportive
information is tested based on the tendency of the participants to recall
or produce reasons supporting the view they have. In the experiment by
Perkins, Farady and Bushley (1991), participants were more able to gener-
ate reasons which support their views than reasons which run counter to it.
Indeed, psychologists have perceived this tendency as the desire to believe.
The possible explanations for confirmation bias are as follows. First, peo-
ple have the desire to believe. They find it easier to believe propositions
that they would like to be true than propositions that they would prefer
to be false. Second, people value consistency and rationality. They would
like beliefs and evidence to be consistent, and consistency is an important
requirement for rationality. Third, people have cognitive limitations. People
tend to acquire information about only one hypothesis at a time, and this
hypothesis is considered to be either true or false, but never both simultane-
ously. People may also fail to consider an alternative hypothesis because they
simply do not think to do so. Fourth, people tend to have positivity bias.
When there is no compelling evidence, people tend to assume a statement to
be true than false (Nickerson, 1998). Fifth, people are pragmatic and tend to
avoid making errors. People are more likely to be concerned about desirable
outcomes than about the truth or falsity of hypotheses (Schwartz, 1982). An-
other reason for the presence of bias is deduced from the prior information
dependence behavior. Studies by Snyder and Gangested (1981) and Snyder
and Swann(1978) involved personality tests highlighting the degree to which
people see or remember a particular occurrence corresponding to what they
look for in a similar situation in future settings.
The bias is present in many learning processes. In a study by Baron
(1995), many people judged the quality of arguments to be higher for one-
sided arguments than for two-sided arguments. This finding suggests that the
bias for one-sided arguments may be partially due to common beliefs about
what makes an argument strong. In another study (Kuhn, 1989), children
and young adults did not acknowledge evidence that was inconsistent with
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a favored theory or saw the evidence selectively or distortingly. The same
evidence was also interpreted differently in relation to a favored theory versus
an unfavored theory. Matlin and Stang (1978) argued that people find it
easier to believe propositions they would like to be true than propositions
they would prefer to be false. This argument is furthered by Weinstein (1989)
who proposed that people demand very little compelling information for a
conclusion that they would like to accept.
3 Information Search and Adjustment of Opin-
ions
We start with a population of N agents with continuous beliefs or hypotheses
(R) which are randomly distributed among agents on a lattice. We adopt
the communication regime by Hegselmann and Krause (2002) and assume all
agents can perceive all local agents’ opinions. We limit local interaction to
eight agents. In each time step, an agent can interact with one agent locally,
and that agent interacts with his neighboring agents locally. There are a
total of 50 x 50 agents on the lattice.
Each individual is represented by a vector on a site, which consists of
four elements. The first element is the opinion, which is represented by
X ∈ {0, 1}, R ∈ {0, 1} is the reservation value, U ∈ {0, 1} is the utility and
I ∈ {R, 1} is the information spread in the lattice. Non-adoption occurs
when opinion is less than one or X 6= 1. Reservation or hypothesis or belief
is the benchmark value against information spread in the lattice. During
interactions, the reservation value is compared to information relayed in the
lattice to evaluate whether the information is positive or negative. Informa-
tion which exceeds this value is considered positive, otherwise negative.
At each time step any two agents meet; they seek information about a
particular product from the agent they interact with. Adjustment of opinion
takes place between these two agents. Suppose two agents xi and xj meet
and the adjustment of opinions takes place;
Xi = xi + µ ({Ij}, Ri) , (1)
where i 6= j and µ : [P (Ij), Ri] → <, where < is positive real number. And
the information (I) spread is defined as:
Ii = β (Ui, Ri) , (2)
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The µ and β are convergence parameters which are determined by informa-
tion (I) and reservation or hypothesis (R), and utility (U) and reservation
(R) respectively. In equation [1], if Ij > Ri, the adjustment of µ is in the
range of 0.1 to 0.3, and in the range of 0 to 0.1 otherwise. If Ui > Ri, the
value of β will be in the range of (R, 1). This means that if the utility is
higher than reservation or hypothesis, agent will spread information (I) at
the level which is higher than the reservation point (R), and if it is lower
than reservation value agent will spread information (I) lower than his reser-
vation value. Therefore, β will be in the range of (0, R). In the model, we
assume the threshold or reservation value R to be constant throughout the
interaction.
The agent practices confirmation bias in three different ways. First, we
assume that the agent will increase his preference for a product by 0.3, i.e.,
x + 0.3 each interaction if he receives positive information from either one
of his eight neighboring agents; that is, the quality information received
from one of the agents is Ij > Ri, provided that the neighboring agent
has adopted the product, Xj = 1 and the agent himself has not adopted
the product, Xi = 0. However, it takes three agents to persuade that the
product is not good. We denote a´ as a subset of the agent’s eight neighbors,
A¨={N,NE,E,SE,S,SW,W,NW} and a´ ∈ A¨ where a´=3 can be any three agents
from set A¨ who have had a bad experience with a particular product. If
a´ display negative feedback, i.e., Ua´ < Ra´ and for this reason the agents
relay Ia´ < Rc, where agent c is the agent we want to investigate. If in the
first interaction, a´={E, N, W}and second interaction, a´={S,NW,SW} the
adjustment of opinion with confirmation bias can be illustrated as;
Xi(t) = xi
Xi(t+ 1) = Xi(t) + µ˜(IE(t), IN(t), IW (t), RE,N,W (t))
Xi(t+ 2) = Xi(t+ 1) + µ˜(IS(t+ 1), INW (t+ 1), ISW (t+ 1), RS,NW,SW )
we set µ˜(•) = -0.1 for both cases. Thus, the opinion dynamic is biased for
reservation or hypothesis consistent information.
Second, in the learning process, agent will decrease 0.1 of his preference
if he finds there are three agents in the neighborhood who have not adopted
the product. Let (xi)
∞
i=1 denote the hypotheses formed in a lattice, and the
local interaction of xi is (xi)
A¨
i=1. If
∑
x3i=1=0, µi → −0.1.
Thirdly, after adoption, the agent will relay two types of information: (1)
bias up and (2) bias down. Bias up occurs when agent outweighs the positive
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information. If the agent is neutral, and no bias is applied, the positive
information relayed ranges from R to 1 when U > R. But if it is outweighed,
the information relayed becomes Ibiasup = (R+ ², 1), where ² is some positive
number. And if U < R, agent will apply bias on the negative information
relayed, Ibiasdown = (0, R − ²). In a situation when agent outweighs negative
information than positive information, then Ibiasdown Â Ibiasup where “ Â ” is
denoted as preference over. But if agent is biased for positive information,
then Ibiasup Â Ibiasdown. This third assumption is based on the behavior of
consumers who like to externalize the hypothesis inconsistent information.
Instead of blaming himself for his selectivity of information as in the previous
two learning processes explained above, the agent blames the low quality of
the product and the producer. 1
4 Simulation
We simulate the opinion-dynamics when agents practice confirmation bias in
information gathering and spreading. We hypothesize that;
• The convergence of opinions occurs if information spread condorms to
reservation or hypothesis.
• If the information is confirming, the adoption rate is higher than when
the information is disconfirming; this renders different speed of adop-
tion in the two situations.
• Disconfirming information is over-weighted more than confirming in-
formation after purchase which causes opinion divergence.
Confirmation bias renders higher sensitivity of consumers to positive news
than negative news. Figure 1 illustrates the opinion dynamics of different
levels of information spread and reservation value. If we imagine R to be
different levels of hypothesis of a consumer, any level of information ( infor-
mation spread depends on the level of utility spread in the lattice) which is
disconfirming (low U), will not be adopted. However, when the information
conforms to the hypothesis, as when the level of U is high, the adoption of
the information is smooth. This different response renders various slopes of
adoption curves in the figure for different values of U. As shown in the figure,
the adoption rate is higher when there is hypothesis consistent information
(high level of U) than when there is hypothesis inconsistent information.
1The program of confirmation bias in Mathematica is available upon request from
reader.
6
Figure 1: The opinion dynamics for different levels of information spread (I) and different
levels of utility (U) . Axis y denotes the number of opinions reaching 1, and axis x denotes
number of interactions when R varies.
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4.1 The Basic Case: Small Threshold
We start with the simulation when the threshold value between reservation
and ex post utility is at the minimum, i.e., U −R ≥ 0. For a small threshold,
opinion dynamics is thwarted by a high reservation value; although the ex
post utility is high, the reservation value in the neighborhood is also high.
• For a small threshold value between reservation and ex post utility,
many clusters of opinion will be formed.
• The non-consensus of opinions causes heterogenous information to be
relayed. Convergence occurs only at the local level; global convergence
is difficult to achieve.
4.2 High Threshold When U > R
When the ex post utility is higher than the reservation value of an agent, he
will relay Ibiasup = (R + ², 1). We observe a convergence of opinions into a
single cluster on the lattice. This is due to the overconfidence and favorable
treatment of positive information. Overconfidence occurs when agents spread
bias up information, and the contacted agents increase their opinions faster
when the information is confirming rather than disconfirming information.
4.3 High Threshold When U < R
When the utility is lower than the reservation, disconfirming information will
be outweighed and causes global non-consensus. Agents start to blame the
low quality of a product rather than the selectivity of information during
the search process. The bias down information, i.e., Ibiasdown = (0, R − ²)
will be further enhanced by lower reserved agents. If two contacting agents
are related through a chain of interactions, the bias down information will
spread and convince other agents from different reservation clusters.
5 Results and Discussion
When comparing the opinion dynamics for different thresholds, decreasing
difference in reservation and utility results in a larger variety of final opinions
(opinion clusters). Observing the initial and final opinions in Figure 2, one
sees the dynamics converge to many opinion clusters. Initial opinions gath-
ered are later segregated due to low difference between utility and reservation
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values. Many outliers are apparent in the plot. A similar pattern is observed
in Figure 3 with a higher value of reservation and utility level.
Figure 2: Slow Opinion convergence when R=0.3,1 and U=0.3,1, 200 individuals and 50
to 500 interactions. Each line represents individual opinion.
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Figure 3: Opinions clusters when R=0.8, 1 and U=0.8,1, 200 individuals and 100 to 500
interactions.
5.1 Large Difference Between Reservation and Utility
Large differences of reservation and utility, particularly when U > R, renders
fast adoption due to selectivity of information to confirm hypothesis during
the learning process. An explanation offered is that adopting a confirming in-
formation is faster than accepting a disconfirming information. When agents
become overconfident, clusters of opinions break down. Figure 4 shows the
opinion convergence.
However, in the case when R > U , initial opinions are segregated further
by agents over-weighting the negative quality information. When the ex post
utility is low, an agent will tell a very bad story about the product to other
interacting agents. This bias in information spread will kill the product.
Figure 5 shows the divergence of opinions when agents overweigh negative
information.
5.2 Opinion Clusters for Different Values of R and U
For a large threshold value, when U −R > 0.2, opinion convergence or fewer
clusters are observed. Many opinion clusters are formed if U − R < −0.1.
The opinion dynamics become static or stagnant when U −R is in the range
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Figure 4: Opinion convergence when R=0.3,1 and U=0.8,1, 200 individuals and 50 to
500 interactions and the convergence occurs around 260 interactions
Figure 5: Opinion divergence when R=0.8,1 and U=0.3,1, 200 individuals and 50 to 500
interactions
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of {0, 0.2}. Figure 1 shows the opinion clusters for different values of utility
and reservation.
On the squared lattice, any agent can interact with his eight connected
neighbors. At each time step, a pair is randomly selected among the con-
nected agents and their opinions are updated based on equations [1] and [2].
Figures 6 and 7 show the opinion percolation when the reservation value is
high. From the figures, the percolation (which is denoted by black dots on
the lattice) is local, i.e., islands of opinion do not connect to each other.
Consensus is reached when the threshold value, i.e., U −R is more than 0.2.
Figure 8 shows the global percolation of opinion when the threshold value
is high, R = 0.3 and U = 0.8. This is due to incrementation of confidence
when agents select hypothesis-related information.
6 Implications
The Stickiness of Response When Information is Positive
One of the causes of confirmation bias is the loss aversion behavior; where
the utility gained from the confirmed preference is lower than the utility loss
if the preference is disconfirmed. (Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1991) . Thus after the purchase, if the quality is lower than
expected, instead of blaming himself for making the choice, the agent blames
the producer or product, which causes him to spread outweighed negative
news in the market. This makes the product less welcome in the subsequent
interactions among the agents and the percolation becomes localized. The
presence of bias also highlights that negative news are taken more seriously
than positive news and the speed of adoption of bad information is higher
than the speed of adoption of positive information.
Overconfidence
It is usually not difficult to find evidence to substantiate a belief when a
preference or hypothesis is formed. If we imagine the lattice sites as confi-
dence and belief, Figure 8 displays the opinion-dynamic when agents exhibit
overconfidence. In the figure, information search involves positive informa-
tion that confirms the opinion. For example, the opinion is incremented by
0.3 when the positive information is received, i.e., I > R, which is higher
than 0.1 if the agent received negative information. Although he may en-
counter negative information in the subsequent interactions, the increase in
confidence is higher than the decrease in confidence level. Over time, this
reinforces the positive opinion of the agent. Therefore, in Figure 8, although
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the agent starts with low confidence (i.e., low value of x), information search
in the interaction process can help reinforce the confidence. Overconfidence
leads to societal convergence.
Divergence of Willingness to Pay for Similar Products
Confirmation bias occurs when people want to believe a particular belief
is true. If two different belief reference points are formed, say by adver-
tisements, subsequent information received will be benchmarked against the
points. Different reference points are tantamount to different expectations,
e.g., expectation on quality, comfort, performance, etc. This leads to different
levels of willingness to pay (maximum amount willing to pay).
Success Breeds Success
The presence of bias in information search and relay can in particular be
found among movie goers. Due to prior experience of a director or star, con-
sumers expect the same or higher degree of innovation in the newly released
movie. If these expectations are captured in the preview or trailer before re-
lease, the subsequent information spread will be in favor of this movie. The
spread of information also becomes more in favor of the movie as consumers
become more confident.
If the information is negative and disconfirms the preference or expecta-
tion, consumers will spread and outweigh the negative information. These
two phenomena, overconfidence when the choice is optimal and outweigh-
ing the negative information when the quality is not as expected, cause the
unequal distribution of revenue among the movies.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we simulate decision making when agents practice confirmation
bias. When there is confirmation bias, it takes less hypothesis-consistent in-
formation to confirm reservation than hypothesis-inconsistent information to
disconfirm reservation. This causes faster upward opinion adjustment when
agents receive positive information than negative information. We simulate
three different sources of confirmation bias as in past literature and relate
them to societal decisions. They are preferential treatment on supportive
information by agents, overconfidence of one’s belief, and externalization of
dissatisfaction when the quality after purchase is low. The first two learning
processes lead agents to adopt positive information more easily than negative
information, which leads to convergence of opinions. However, overconfidence
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with one’s hypothesis leads agents to treat hypothesis-consistent information
more seriously than hypothesis-inconsistent information. This leads agents
to spread very negative information when the product is less than satisfactory
and that causes divergence of opinions.
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Figure 6: The percolation of opinions when U=(0.8,1), R=(0.8,1), I=0.5 for
1(23),10(48),20(97),30(147),40(197),50(246),60(286) ,70(327),80(370),90 (404), 100 (434)
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Figure 7: The percolation of opinions when U=(0.3,1), R=(0.8,1), I=0.5 for
1(23),10(38),20(38),30(43),40(43),50(43),60(43),70(43),80(43),90(43), 100(43) and 150(43)
interactions
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Figure 8: The percolation of opinions when U=(0.8,1), R=(0.3,1), I=(0,R-
0.5) for 1(23),10(93),20(250),30(424),40(612),50(774),60(911),70(1045),80(1155),90(1265),
100(1354) and 150(1720) interactions.
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